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Abstract 
 
In 2015 the South African judiciary was confronted with the issue 
of the so-called "right to die", when Robin Stransham-Ford 
applied to the High Court of South Africa (the North Gauteng 
Division) for an order to have his life terminated. Although the 
Supreme Court of Appeal set aside the order (on procedural 
grounds), the High Court's judgment paved the way towards 
renewed attention regarding the possible legalisation of 
euthanasia. A pertinent question arising from this is whether a 
medical practitioner may be compelled to participate in the 
administering of euthanasia. Bearing this in mind, this article 
argues for the protection of the rights of medical practitioners 
who conscientiously object to participating in the administering 
of euthanasia, especially where such an objection is based on 
religious beliefs. From this arises the necessity to investigate the 
rights applicable both to the medical practitioner and the patient 
(which focusses on the right to freedom of religion and personal 
autonomy), the weighing up against one another of the different 
meanings ascribed to such rights, as well as the postulation of a 
substantively competitive rationale against the background of 
the importance and sacredness of human life. This also overlaps 
with the importance of the endeavour towards higher levels of 
religious freedoms and consequently of plurality in democratic 
societies. Applying the proportionality test in the analysis 
whether a medical practitioner's rights may be reasonably and 
justifiably limited against the background of administering 
euthanasia also strengthens the argument for the protection of 
the medical practitioner's right to object conscientiously to the 
administering of euthanasia. This, together with the vacuum 
there is in substantive human rights jurisprudence related to this 
topic, suggests the importance of this article both for the South 
African context and beyond. 
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1 Introduction 
In 1998 the government instructed the South African Law Commission to 
draft a report called the Law Commission Report on Euthanasia and the 
Artificial Preservation of Life, Project 86. This report entailed a 
comprehensive investigation of euthanasia and assisted suicide, and it was 
addressed to the Minister of Justice, as determined by the South African 
Law Commission Act,1 for possible approval.2 However, no further legal 
development took place until more than a decade later, on 30 April 2015, 
when the South African High Court (as per Fabricius J)3 consented to Robin 
Stransham-Ford's application to the court, allowing a medical practitioner to 
euthanise him. Although Stransham-Ford passed away before the order of 
the judge could be complied with, moral and jurisprudential concerns 
regarding euthanasia were now the topic of discussion. Fabricius J had held 
that the said ruling served as a basis for the further development of the law 
regarding euthanasia: 
The topic is in my view important enough, having regard to the relevant 
principles contained in the Bill of Rights, that serious consideration be given 
to introducing a Bill based on the South African Law Commission's Report, 
which suggested a number of options, but supported the development of the 
common law in this context. It is certainly a topic that deserves broad 
discussion, but in the context of the Bill of Rights especially.4 
                                            
* Adriaan Knoetze. LLB LLM (UFS) is an admitted attorney employed at the 
Federation of South African School Governing Bodies (FEDSAS) in South Africa, 
where he is involved in writing legal opinions, commenting on policy and 
departmental documents and providing legal advice to schools. E-mail: 
lo2@fedsas.org.za. This article stems from my unpublished Masters in Law 
dissertation titled The Right to Conscientious Objection against Administering 
Euthanasia in the Context of the Right to Freedom of Religion (UFS 2018). 
**  Shaun de Freitas. B Proc LLB LLM LLD (UFS). Professor, Faculty of Law, University 
of the Free State, South Africa. Adjunct Professor, School of Law, University of Notre 
Dame Sydney (Fremantle Campus). E-mail: defreitas@ufs.ac.za.  
1  South African Law Commission Act 19 of 1973 (now the South African Law Reform 
Commission Act 19 of 1973, as amended by the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 55 
of 2002), s 7(1).  
2  Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 2015 4 SA 50 (GP) 
para 1. 
3  Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 2015 4 SA 50 (GP). 
4  Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 2015 4 SA 50 (GP) 
para 1. Despite its irrelevance to the argument in this article, it may be of interest to 
note that the case proceeded to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Minister of 
Justice and Correctional Services v Estate Late James Stransham-Ford 2017 3 SA 
152 (SCA). The SCA was of the view that the Pretoria High Court erred (on 
procedural grounds) in making the decision it did, and upheld the appeal by the 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (para 101). 
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Although there is extensive legal scholarship on euthanasia,5 there is an 
evident void in scholarship regarding the protection of the freedom of 
medical practitioners6 to object conscientiously to administering 
euthanasia.7 This article argues for the protection of conscientious objection 
by medical practitioners regarding the administering of euthanasia in South 
Africa, and that this is of relevance to other democratic and plural societies 
that may be confronted with conscientious objection claims related to 
euthanasia within the health care system. The article begins with an 
explanation of the various types of euthanasia applicable, and goes on to 
elaborate on the importance of the right to freedom of religion and its 
inextricable relationship with other substantive rights such as the right to life, 
human dignity and privacy. It is further postulated that an unreasonable and 
unjustifiable infringement on the medical practitioner's basic rights indeed 
occurs where the law compels a medical practitioner to participate in the 
administering of euthanasia.  
2 Clarifying the categories of euthanasia 
Euthanasia is a broad concept fraught with a multitude of views, and 
frequently confusion exists in this regard.8 According to John Keown, if 
different parties understand euthanasia to mean quite different things, their 
discussion is likely to be fruitless and frustrating.9 It is therefore important to 
provide views on what constitutes euthanasia for the purposes of the 
                                            
5  Regarding the South African context, see for example: Egan 2008 SAJBL 47-52; 
McQuoid-Mason 2015 SAJBL 34-40; Slabbert and Van der Westhuizen 2007 SAPL 
366-384; Malherbe and Venter 2011 TSAR 466-495. For views beyond the South 
African context see, for example, Keown Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy; 
Russel Freedom to Die; Novak Sanctity of Human Life; Paterson Assisted Suicide 
and Euthanasia; Finnis 1998 Loy LA L Rev 1125.  
6  For clarity on who should be included in the category of "medical practitioner", 
Theriot and Connellys' referral to the description given by the Mississippi Code 
Annexure § 41-107-3 (2016) should be followed. It refers to "health care provider" 
broadly as "any individual who may be asked to participate in any way in a health 
care service, including, but not limited to: a physician, physician's assistant, nurse, 
nurses' aide, medical assistant, hospital employee, clinic employee, nursing home 
employee, pharmacist, pharmacy employee, researcher, medical or nursing school 
faculty, student or employee, counsellor, social worker or any professional, 
paraprofessional, or any other person who furnishes, or assists in the furnishing of, 
a health care procedure". Theriot and Connelly 2017 Ariz St LJ 581-582. 
7  For example, the following substantive sources dealing with the right to freedom of 
religion and conscientious objection do not delve into the matter related to this study: 
Ahdar and Leigh Religious Freedom; and Wicclair Conscientious Objection in Health 
Care.  
8  Chao, Chan and Chan 2002 Family Practice 128. 
9  Keown Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy 9-10. 
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protection of the medical practitioner's freedom to object conscientiously to 
the administering of euthanasia. "Active" euthanasia normally involves the 
health practitioner's taking deliberate steps to end the life of a person who 
voluntarily requests such steps due to suffering. More specifically, Keown is 
of the view that voluntary active euthanasia is generally understood as 
euthanasia at the request of the patient,10 which implies that involuntary 
active euthanasia takes place without the patient's having requested it.11 
Then there is the doctrine of the double effect, which covers the 
administration of drugs to relieve a terminally ill patient's pain and suffering, 
despite the medical practitioner's awareness that this may have the 
incidental effect of hastening the patient's death.12 This could be understood 
as being inextricably related to active euthanasia, and may overlap with 
forms of both "voluntary" and "involuntary" active euthanasia. Passive 
euthanasia, on the other hand, does not comprise the taking of actual 
deliberate steps to end the life of the person through some procedure, but 
the omission to prolong life.13 This involves the cessation of the treatment 
of a patient, such treatment being the sole cause of continuing the patient's 
life. This specifically entails that the patient be removed from any life support 
equipment, where had it not been for such equipment, the patient would 
have succumbed already.14 One can argue that passive forms of euthanasia 
may also be voluntary or non-voluntary, and an example is where a medical 
practitioner, in following the stipulations of a patient's living will (which is 
discussed below), brings about the cessation of the provision of natural food 
or hydration to the said patient (who is unconscious). This may then be 
viewed as voluntary, whilst involuntary passive euthanasia is applied where 
the same omission is performed by the medical practitioner, but where there 
was no living will that confirms the patient's intention to have his/her life 
terminated in such a situation.  
Besides the categorisation of euthanasia along the lines of active and 
passive euthanasia, there is also the administration of PAS (physician-
assisted suicide). Stuart Beresford defines PAS as the involvement of the 
medical practitioner in providing a lethal substance to a patient to self-
administer in order to commit suicide in a painless manner.15 What sets it 
                                            
10  Keown Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy 9. 
11  Also see Beresford 2005 Human Rights Research 5; Paterson Assisted Suicide and 
Euthanasia 12. 
12  Beresford 2005 Human Rights Research 5. 
13  Garrard and Wilkinson 2005 J Med Ethics 64. 
14  MacKinnon and Fiala Ethics 206. Also see Garrard and Wilkinson 2005 J Med Ethics 
65. 
15  Beresford 2005 Human Rights Research 5. Also see Paterson Assisted Suicide and 
Euthanasia 11. 
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apart from "ordinary active euthanasia" is that it is referred to as "suicide" in 
that, although the doctor assists the patient by providing the necessary 
paraphernalia,16 the final step to end his/her life is ultimately taken by the 
patient him/herself.17 Francis Beckwith and Norman Geisler explain that 
suicide where someone other than the person who chooses to die "assists 
such a person who chooses to die, to die", constitutes a form of active 
euthanasia. This makes sense against the background understanding that18 
… suicide is an individual's intentional ending of life, either by one's own hand, 
another's assistance, or by another's hand. 
"Living wills" may also be related to euthanasia. For example, a person may 
stipulate in his/her will that if s/he is involved in a motor vehicle accident and 
left in an irreversible unconscious state, no prolonging medical should be 
administered. Instead, s/he should simply be allowed to pass away. 
According to Beckwith and Geisler, living wills may allow for either active or 
passive euthanasia.19  
Bearing the above in mind, and for the purposes of this article, euthanasia 
should be understood as including both possibilities, active and passive. It 
has as its principal actor a medical practitioner or any other person clearly 
related to health care, whether directly involved (such as a physician who 
personally administers a deadly substance) or indirectly involved (such as 
a nurse who is approached to assist the former). It is also clear from the 
above that PAS may form part of euthanasia and that the "living will" is of 
relevance.  
3 The right to freedom of religion and conscientious 
objection 
The South African judiciary, especially the Constitutional Court, has adopted 
a positive approach regarding the importance and protection of the right to 
freedom of religion (and to thought, opinion, conscience and belief) against 
the background of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa's Bill of 
Rights.20 This must consequently be the context of an argument in support 
                                            
16  Such as drugs, toxins or machines.  
17  Moss 2013 http://www.dignityindying.org.uk/blog/assisted-dying-not-assisted-
suicide/. 
18  Beckwith and Geisler Matters of Life and Death 155. 
19  Beckwith and Geisler Matters of Life and Death 145. 
20  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 15(1): "Everyone has the right 
to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion." There have been a 
fair number of challenges presented before the South African Constitutional Court 
pertaining to the right to freedom of religion and emanating from these challenges 
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of conscientious objection against the intentional termination of innocent 
human life. Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh comment that:21 
Medicine deals with pain, suffering, and death, subjects that touch the very 
heart of religion as well. It should not surprise anyone that medical treatment 
controversies often reflect differing world views of the protagonists … to insist 
there is a neutral, objective basis upon which to judge these conflicts is to 
maintain 'the fiction of neutrality'22 as some medical ethicists call it. There is 
no 'View from Nowhere'.23 
This is of relevance to conscientious objection against the administering of 
euthanasia by medical practitioners, as it deals with pain, suffering and 
death in a most fundamental manner and therefore naturally touches on the 
heart of many religions and their accompanying moral views. Robert George 
refers to the natural law argument for religious liberty, which is based on the 
obligation of each person to pursue the truth about religious matters.24 In 
this regard, George comments:  
… religion – considered as conscientious truth seeking regarding the ultimate 
sources of meaning and value – is a crucial dimension of human well-being 
and fulfillment. It is among the basic human goods that provide rational 
motivation for our choosing. The right to religious liberty follows from the 
dignity of man as a conscientious seeker.25 
George adds that religion pertains to ultimate matters; religion representing 
our efforts to bring ourselves into a "relationship of friendship with 
transcendent sources of meaning and value"; and that religion assists us to 
view our lives as a whole and forms an essential component of our 
flourishing as human beings.26 According to Alan Brownstein:27  
                                            
were constructive views by the judiciary regarding religion. In this regard, see S v 
Lawrence 1997 4 SA 1176 (CC) para 92; Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2002 
2 SA 794 (CC) para 38; and Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 
2000 4 SA 757 (CC) para 19. Also see Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 1 SA 
524 (CC) para 89. South Africa is also party to a number of international instruments 
regarding the protection of religious freedom, namely: International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966) art 18; African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights (1981) art 8; and UN Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance 
and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief (1981) arts 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 4.1, 4.2 
and 7. 
21  Ahdar and Leigh Religious Freedom 319. 
22  Secundy and Sundstrom, cited in Ahdar and Leigh Religious Freedom 319. 
23  Cowley, cited in Ahdar and Leigh Religious Freedom 319. 
24  Second Vatican Council II Declaration on Religious s 2-3 800-801, cited in George, 
Conscience and its Enemies 91. 
25  George Conscience and its Enemies 91. 
26  George Conscience and its Enemies 118, 123. In this regard, George refers to Finnis 
Natural Law and Natural Rights.  
27  Brownstein, cited in Ahdar and Leigh Religious Freedom 76. 
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The free exercise of religion is essentially a dignitary right. It is part of that 
basic autonomy of identity and self-creation which we preserve from state 
manipulation, not because of its utility to social organization, but because of 
its importance to the human condition. Along with sexual autonomy, intimate 
association, and the dignitary aspects of speech, property and procedural due 
process, this is a right of self-determination and fulfillment, not social order 
and policy. 
The State has the obligation to ensure that religious believers are not 
subjected to painful and agonising choices either to remain true to their 
religious convictions or to submit to the law,28 as religious adherence is 
ingrained in the lives, cultures and temperaments of many believers.29 In S 
v Lawrence, Chaskalson J quoted the following from R v Big M Drug Mart 
Ltd30 by the Supreme Court of Canada:31 
The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such 
religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs 
openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest 
religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination. 
Chaskalson J, also with reference to the said Canadian judgment, added 
that:32   
… freedom of religion implies an absence of coercion or constraint and that 
freedom of religion may be impaired by measures that force people to act or 
refrain from acting in a manner contrary to their religious beliefs.  
Sachs J in Christian Education states that:33   
Religious belief has the capacity to awake concepts of self-worth and human 
dignity which form the cornerstone of human rights.  
The South African Constitutional Court held in MEC for Education: Kwazulu-
Natal v Pillay that it is:34 
… convinced that the [wearing of a nose ring for religious and cultural 
purposes] was a peculiar and particularly significant manifestation of her … 
identity. It was her way of expressing her roots and her faith. While others may 
have expressed the same faith, traditions and beliefs differently or not at all, 
                                            
28  Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC) para 
35. 
29  Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC) para 
33. 
30  R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd 1985 1 SCR 295. 
31  S v Lawrence 1997 4 SA 1176 (CC) para 92. 
32  S v Lawrence 1997 4 SA 1176 (CC) para 92 (emphasis added). 
33  Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC) para 
36. 
34  MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 90 (emphasis 
added). 
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the evidence shows that it was important for Sunali to express her religion and 
culture through wearing the nose stud. 
In this regard, the Court placed the focus on whether the religious practice 
was of importance to the believer himself/herself (and not primarily on 
whether the practice is in line with the tenets of a specific religion).  
There is also the inextricable link between a religious belief and the 
conscience. "Conscience" refers to a person's inner knowledge, such as an 
internal conviction,35 and can also refer to a practice based on what is right, 
which serves as a warning mechanism, exerting an effect on a person that 
a particular thought, action or feeling is wrong or evil.36 Section 15 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa caters for the protection of a 
moral objection, or an objection based on one's conscience. In addition, 
having a religious belief and subsequently acting in accordance therewith is 
a core ingredient of any person's human dignity.37 According to Mark 
Wicclair, many conceptions of the conscience incorporate the notion that 
matters of conscience involve,38   
… a particularly important subset of an agent's ethical or religious beliefs – 
core moral beliefs.  
Wicclair adds that "conscience-based refusals" constitute the following:39 
(1) the agent has a core set of moral (i.e. ethical or religious) beliefs; (2) 
providing the good or service is incompatible with the agent's core moral 
beliefs; and (3) the agent's refusal is based on her core moral beliefs. 
In this regard, and for the purposes of this article, it is emphasised that 
conscientious objection against the administering of euthanasia constitutes 
an inherent, serious and sincere aversion by a medical practitioner to 
participate in an act that impinges on deep religious (or secular) convictions 
regarding a matter that is inherently of serious concern, namely the 
intentional taking of innocent human life. The administering of euthanasia 
does not constitute an act of self-defence, but rather of intentionally 
terminating that which is believed to be (and this is a rational belief at that) 
an innocent human life that poses no substantive threat to those in the 
                                            
35  Haigh and Bowal 2012 http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/316 23. 
36  Haigh and Bowal 2012 http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/316 23. 
37  Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC) para 
36. 
38  Wicclair Conscientious Objection in Health Care 4. 
39  Wicclair Conscientious Objection in Health Care 5. 
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presence of the patient.40 The eminent legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin is 
of the view that abortion and euthanasia comprise two key areas of value 
conflict: 
Deep principled disagreement over the value of life plus respect for liberty of 
conscience empowers individuals to make their own choices. The meaning of 
the value of life is such a deeply contestable topic, open to many divergent 
viewpoints – viewpoints that can express sophisticated defences – that it is 
unreasonable for one viewpoint to seek to impose its account over all other 
viewpoints.41 
It is precisely this disagreement regarding the value of life which confirms 
that the matter at hand is not clear-cut, and which in turn lends credibility to 
the convictions of the medical practitioner as well. This also explains, for 
example, the position taken by the judiciary in Roe v Wade,42 the case that 
opened the floodgates of abortion in the US (and consequently around the 
world) about ensuring the protection of the medical practitioner's right to 
conscientiously object to participating in abortion practices.43 It is precisely 
the differences of opinion about when human life precisely begins and about 
the legal and moral status of the unborn, that should allow for the protection 
of those who are substantively concerned about protecting what they 
believe to be human, such as the unborn (or the foetus).44 The complexities 
and differences of opinion regarding the ending of human life in the context 
of the termination of innocent human life, even where it is the person 
himself/herself that wishes to die, for whatever reason are equally fraught.. 
In other words, the complexities and differences of opinion related to 
euthanasia should also allow for the views of those who respect and with to 
                                            
40  It is important to note that there may be instances where a decision to withdraw 
further treatment that eventually leads to the death of the patient may be morally 
justified in the eyes of the medical practitioner who generally objects to partaking in 
practices in which euthanasia is exercised. In this regard, cognisance needs to be 
taken of the following view by Pope John Paul II: "Euthanasia must be distinguished 
from the decision to forego so-called 'aggressive medical treatment', in other words, 
medical procedures which no longer correspond to the real situation of the patient, 
either because they are by now disproportionate to any expected results or because 
they impose an excessive burden on the patient and his family. In such situations, 
when death is clearly imminent and inevitable, one can in conscience 'refuse forms 
of treatment that would only secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation of 
life, so long as the normal care due to the sick person in similar cases is not 
interrupted". Pope John Paul II 1995 http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae.html 
(hereafter Evangelium Vitae) para 65.  
41  Dworkin Life's Dominion 35. 
42  Roe v Wade 410 US 113 (1973). 
43  See Theriot and Connelly 2017 Ariz St LJ 558-559. 
44  See De Freitas 2011 IJRF 75-85.  
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protect innocent human life, even when it is accompanied by pain and 
suffering. What one is dealing with in these instances are contentious moral 
matters related to the beginning and ending of human life, which is a topic 
that is in and of itself of fundamental importance. In such matters, 
sensitivities need to be protected. 
The conscientious objection that the medical practitioner holds becomes 
even more credible and sincere when taking into cognisance the said 
practitioner's intense belief that the administering of euthanasia constitutes 
murder, which is a violation of the Divine Commandment, "Thou shall not 
kill".45 The protection of the conscience regarding an act or omission 
remains an important freedom that should be protected as it inexorably 
connects (as alluded to earlier) with the protection of human dignity. This 
has to do with what Steven Smith refers to as "being a full person" or what 
Martin Belsky considers the conscience, the free exercise whereof being 
the46  
ability of individuals … to be free from coercion so that they can act or not act 
in accordance with some 'core personal beliefs or principles'. 
Mark Wicclair refers to Jeffrey Blustein's observation that when one acts 
against one's conscience,47  
… one violates one's own fundamental moral or religious convictions, 
personal standards that one sees as an important part of oneself and by which 
one is prepared to judge oneself. 
Wicclair adds that an unprotected conscience may result in: (1) the harming 
of a person's concept of a good or meaningful life; (2) feelings of guilt, 
remorse, shame and self-respect; and (3) a decline in a person's moral 
character (which is especially undesirable for a medical practitioner).48 From 
the above it is therefore evident that the protection of the right to freedom of 
religion and its inextricable relation to human dignity and the conscience is 
of fundamental importance. It should therefore be approached with the 
                                            
45  For confirmation of this Biblical precept, see, for example, Pope John Paul II's 
Evangelium Vitae paras 41, 48, 53 and 77. Pope John Paul II refers to the following 
section of the Donum Vitae, namely: "Human life is sacred because from its 
beginning it involves the 'creative action of God', and it remains forever in a special 
relationship with the Creator, who is its sole end. God alone is the Lord of life … 
Precisely for this reason God will severely judge every violation of the commandment 
'You shall not kill …" (see para 53). Also see Pope John Paul II's Evangelium Vitae 
para 55 (which includes the exception of taking a life when it is in self-defence).  
46  Araujo 2007 Miss LJ 584.  
47  Wicclair Conscientious Objection in Health Care 26. 
48  Wicclair Conscientious Objection in Health Care 26. 
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necessary understanding regarding the protection of the medical 
practitioner's objection against participating in the administering of 
euthanasia.  
4 The test for a reasonable and justifiable limitation 
The relationship between the medical practitioner and the patient against 
the background of conscientious objection against the administering of 
euthanasia naturally leads to a conflict of rights, whether shared or different. 
Therefore, the test to determine whether there is a reasonable and 
justifiable limitation, in accordance with section 36(1) of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa,49 of the rights of the medical practitioner in the 
event that the medical practitioner would be pressured to take part in an 
instance of euthanasia, is not only relevant but a necessity. As will become 
clear, an unreasonable and unjustifiable infringement of the medical 
practitioner's rights indeed occurs when the practitioner is compelled by the 
law to administer euthanasia in opposition to his/her religious convictions. 
Bearing the above in mind, an identification of and consequent investigation 
of the relevant rights in addition to the right to freedom of religion (and 
consequently, of the conscience)50 is required. To begin with, the right to life 
will be elaborated upon, as this right is, for obvious reasons, foundational 
regarding the debate on euthanasia. By focussing on the importance and 
scope of the right to life, the credibility of the medical practitioner's 
conscientious objection against participating in euthanasia is argued for, 
which in turn supports his/her right to human dignity, to freedom of religion 
and to privacy (which overlaps with personhood and autonomy), these being 
rights that will be discussed below and that will further the argument for the 
protection of the medical practitioner who objects against participating in 
euthanasia. 
4.1 The relevant human rights 
An awareness of the importance and sanctity of human life is 
inherent in the mind of persons in general, an understanding 
                                            
49  Which reads as follows: "(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in 
terms of the law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including – (a) the nature of the 
right; (b) the importance and purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of 
the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose. (2) Except as provided in ss (1) or in any 
other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill 
of Rights." 
50  Which has been substantively dealt with earlier on. 
A KNOETZE & S DE FREITAS PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  12 
which is important when dealing with the termination51 of 
innocent human life. Craig Paterson states that life is a grounding 
good, because it sustains all of our choices and actions, and in 
this regard it is of instrumental value. Life is also of intrinsic 
importance52 and enjoys protection, as prescribed by the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which states, 
"Everyone has the right to life",53 and by international human 
rights instruments.54 Having said this, the attainment of 
consensus related to an understanding of "life" and its worth 
proves to be most difficult in the context of the debate on the 
legalisation of euthanasia. This is explained in the context of the 
right to privacy (which substantively overlaps with the right to 
personhood, autonomy and freedom of the person). In this 
regard, Robert George points out that there are those supporters 
of the legalisation of euthanasia who distinguish mere biological 
human life from the life of a person. This entails understanding 
that a person possesses developed capacities for:55 
… characteristically human mental activity, such as conceptual thinking, 
deliberation, and choice. According to this understanding, it is 'personal life' 
that has intrinsic value and dignity whilst 'biological life' does not. 
Explained further, this approach views a living human body,56 
… not as a person until it becomes associated with a mind and such a body 
ceases to be a person, not only by dying, but at any point at which it loses this 
association of mind and body. 
This is in contrast with the view that bodily life per se denotes an intrinsic 
good and is therefore an end in itself. The human physical or biological entity 
(which includes the retarded and the comatose) is sufficient to qualify as 
human life, and should therefore enjoy protection. In other words, the body 
does not have a merely and exclusively instrumentalist attribute; rather the 
body constitutes primarily an intrinsic good. For example, the life of a new-
                                            
51  For this very reason, there are those who view euthanasia as the "killing" of innocent 
human life rather than as the "termination" of human life.  
52  Paterson Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia 51. Paterson adds that "Due respect for 
the primary good of human life minimally demands that we always refrain from 
actions intent on killing an innocent person" (see 104). 
53  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 11. 
54  For example, see art 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966) and art 4 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981). Daniel 
Solove's adept study on the conceptualising of privacy, points to an understanding 
of the right to privacy as including the right of every individual to have "control and 
dominion over decisions regarding one's body", Solove 2002 CLR 1135. 
55  George 2006 Touchstone 32.  
56  George 2006 Touchstone 32.  
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born baby, although the baby is substantively under-developed regarding 
its intellectual and experiential ability, remains nevertheless a human life 
that should enjoy full protection:57 
No one doubts, for example, that a day-old-human infant or the very senile 
may lack the actual capacities of, for example, a day old foal … But surely this 
sort of comparison does not convince us that foals somehow have greater 
fundamental worth than human infants or the very senile. If anencephalic 
infants or the very senile were, say, intentionally killed and sold for food, we 
would surely find such a practice deeply undignified and repugnant … if the 
true worth of individual human beings, at the end of the day, were held to be 
ultimately and contingently dependent on having some ready prospect for 
individually exercising capacity X or capacities X … rather than their having 
'radical dignity by virtue of their essential nature,' there should – apart from 
obvious health concerns or feelings of squeamishness or dealing with the 
reaction of relatives – be no deep moral problem with intentionally killing such 
profoundly damaged human beings in order to make use of their harvested 
dead flesh for the manufacture of consumer edibles.58 
This confirms the importance of human life and the understanding that 
human biological life per se remains substantively important and sacred.59 
The right to human dignity also comes into play. References in the 
constitutions of democratic states and international human rights 
instruments to the need to respect the "dignity" or "inherent human dignity" 
of a human being can be viewed as confirming the intrinsic worth of a human 
being. Not only is the freedom of a person's will part of the idea behind 
respect for a person's dignity, but it plays a role in ensuring respect for a 
person's psychological integrity as well.60 Accordingly, the first "element" in 
a proper definition of the right to human dignity would be respect for both 
physical and psychological integrity.61 Oscar Schachter adds that respect 
for dignity would mean that the whims and wishes of one or few members 
of society cannot be used as a coercive tool against the free will of an 
individual; neither can governments impose and enforce beliefs that subject 
an individual or a group's views to conformity with their own, thereby 
asserting their authority over an individual's life that is personal and familial 
                                            
57  Finnis Human Rights and Common Good 247-248. 
58  Paterson Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia 138-139. Paterson also states, "Bodies 
are not 'prisons of the immortal soul' nor are they 'mere biological equipment.' Bodies 
are intrinsically and not merely extrinsically valuable to us because they are 
seamlessly integral to the very reality of who and what we are as persons. A body is 
not something 'sub-personal' to 'personal life' as if X (consciousness life) can be 
radically juxtaposed with Y (bodily life) such that X can be held intrinsically valuable 
to us but not Y. Both X and Y are fully integral to our personal beingness" (see 51). 
59  Finnis 1993 S Ill U LJ 568-569.  
60  Schachter 1983 AJIL 849. 
61  Barroso 2012 B C Int'l & Comp L Rev 364. 
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to that person.62 In addition to ensuring respect for a person's inherent 
worth, the recognition of an individual's personal responsibility should be 
accentuated. This refers to the capacity of a person to make individual 
choices that give expression to his/her distinct identity,63 which in turn 
relates to the enjoyment of dignity. Addressing the relationship between 
human dignity and the importance of ensuring religious freedom, Langa CJ 
in Pillay adds that religious practices are64  
… protected because they are central to human identity and hence to human 
dignity which in turn is central to equality. 
Pope John Paul II emphasised the inextricable connection between human 
dignity and the right to object conscientiously with specific reference to the 
administering of euthanasia in the following:65 
To refuse to take part in committing an injustice is not only a moral duty; it is 
also a basic human right. Were this not so, the human person would be forced 
to perform an action intrinsically incompatible with human dignity, and in this 
way human freedom itself, the authentic meaning and purpose of which are 
found in its orientation to the true and the good, would be radically 
compromised. What is at stake therefore is an essential right which, precisely 
as such, should be acknowledged and protected by civil law. In this sense, the 
opportunity to refuse to take part in the phases of consultation, preparation 
and execution of these acts against life should be guaranteed to physicians, 
health-care personnel, and directors of hospitals, clinics and convalescent 
facilities. 
Compelling a person to abandon his/her religious convictions or to assist 
another to do something that is in his/her eyes abhorrent and which can be 
viewed as entirely irrational against the background of understanding 
human life to be substantively important and sacred constitutes a grave 
infringement on the inherent dignity of such a person. If a medical 
practitioner is forced to act in contradiction of his/her sincerely held 
convictions, this would amount to a non-recognition of his/her inherent worth 
in society, and consequently his/her beingness would be grossly violated.  
The next relevant right to be investigated is the right to privacy, a popular, 
yet complex right66 used in support of the justification of euthanasia.67 
                                            
62  Schachter 1983 AJIL 850. 
63  MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 63. 
64  MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 62. 
65  Pope John Paul II Evangelium Vitae para 74. 
66  Solove points to the fact that scholars and jurists have lamented the great difficulty 
in attaining a satisfying conception of privacy and are of the view that the right to 
privacy is difficult to define, Solove 2002 CLR 1088-1090. 
67  Klein 1994 Leg Ref Serv Q 138; Wolhandler 1984 Cornell L Rev 375; Novak Sanctity 
of Human Life 147. 
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However, as is argued below, the medical practitioner himself/herself is also 
entitled to protection of this right. In South Africa the right to privacy is 
guaranteed in the Constitution.68 An understanding of the right to privacy in 
Western democracies has been extended from only an "informational" 
sense, namely preventing the dissemination of one's personal information, 
to including substantive concepts relevant to the everyday life of the person 
holding the right,69 such as marriage, contraception, education and child 
rearing. It is understood that the term "personhood" includes ideas referring 
to a person's individuality, privacy and autonomy,70 or to who the person is 
according to his/her own mind and spirit. It further grants one the right to be 
left to one's own devices. It refers to a rebuttable presumption that a citizen 
ought to be free to live his/her life in the manner of his/her choosing without 
the government interfering or telling him/her how it should be lived.71This 
support of absolute autonomy and freedom of control over one's mind 
involves, in a medical context, the right to choose whether, in line with one's 
own values and beliefs, one would submit to a particular recommended 
course of treatment.72 Bearing the above in mind, the critical question needs 
to be asked whether compelling a medical practitioner to grievously 
transgress his/her own religious convictions, and to his/her mind, commit a 
heinous act, does not amount to a serious invasion of his/her right to privacy 
and by implication his/her right to autonomy, personhood and self-
determination? This should surely be answered in the affirmative, as is 
confirmed by Daniel Garros's observation that:73 
As the principle of respect for a patient autonomy is MAID's74 pillar, it follows 
that the HCP's autonomy in deciding to refuse to participate in MAID should 
be equally respected.  
Having investigated and elaborated upon the various rights related to a 
medical practitioner who objects to the administering of euthanasia, the 
                                            
68  Section 14 of the Constitution holds that everyone has the right to privacy and it goes 
further by stating that this right "includes the right not to have their home or person 
searched, have their possessions unlawfully seized, their property searched or have 
the privacy of their communications infringed" (emphasis added). 
69  Rubenfeld 1989 Harv L Rev 740. 
70  Craven 1976 Duke LJ 702. Solove also connects privacy to personhood and adds 
that personhood relates in turn amongst others to individuality and autonomy, which 
in turn relate to the right of the individual to make choices regarding his/her body, 
Solove 2002 CLR 1116-1117. Also see 1117 for Solove's criticism related to 
personhood as an overly broad term. 
71  Craven 1976 Duke LJ 706. Also see McClain 1995 Yale JL & Human 195.  
72  Giesen "Dilemmas at Life's End" 201. 
73  Garros 2017 Health Ethics Today 7. This statement by Garros, a medical 
practitioner, is in response to the recent legalisation of euthanasia (or medical 
assistance in dying) in Canada. 
74  MAID stands for Medical Assistance in Dying. 
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application of the general limitations clause follows, to confirm that an 
unreasonable and unjustifiable infringement of the medical practitioner's 
rights indeed occurs when the practitioner is compelled to participate in the 
administering of euthanasia. 
4.2 The general limitations clause test 
The first of the listed criteria that the general limitations clause looks at is 
the nature of the relevant human rights and whether these rights have been 
violated. The nature of the relevant rights of the medical practitioner, namely 
the rights to freedom of religion, human dignity and privacy (which overlaps 
with personal autonomy) was elaborated on earlier. It was explained that to 
compel a medical practitioner to participate in the administering of 
euthanasia violates the said rights of the practitioner. The violation of the 
convictions of the medical practitioner whose religious and moral frame of 
reference supports the protection of innocent life may lead to extreme 
psychological trauma.75 Many religions also observe the foundational 
inviolability and sacredness of innocent human life.76 
Regarding the importance and purpose of the limitation of the medical 
practitioner's rights, which comprises the second of the listed criteria of the 
limitations clause, is the termination of pain and suffering (which may not 
only be viewed from the perspective of physical pain and suffering but also 
from the perspective of psychological trauma). Inextricably related to this is 
the view that distinguishes between human experience and choice (that 
which pertains to the mind) on the one hand and the human biological make-
up (the body) on the other. It was argued earlier that the qualification of the 
termination of human life, in accordance with the view that experiential life 
may no more be enjoyed, flouts the sanctity of human life, which is also 
comprised of a biological dimension. In this regard, the importance of the 
purpose of the limitation (as resulting from euthanasia) as argued by those 
who distinguish between life as experience (mind) and biological human life 
                                            
75  The effects of compulsion to contravene sincere beliefs are elaborated upon below. 
76  Regarding for example Christians and Jews, the first book of the Bible, namely, 
Genesis, is of relevance. According to Genesis 1:27: "… God created man in his 
own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them." 
ESV (English Standard Version). Human life is therefore to be lived in accordance 
with the representation of its origin. Secondly, Genesis 2:7 indicates the difference 
between human life and any other: "Then the Lord God… breathed into his nostrils 
the breath of life, and the man became a living creature". Humans are accordingly 
believed to be creatures with divine attributes derived directly from God and 
therefore it is staunchly believed that it is not within the authority of a person to take 
the life of an innocent human being intentionally. In addition, according to the Gospel 
of Matthew, "You shall love your neighbour as yourself", Matthew 22:37-39.  
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(body) lends itself to critique, which in turn strengthens the credibility of the 
medical practitioner who refuses to participate in the administering of 
euthanasia. This is further substantiated by the arguments presented earlier 
on regarding the intrinsic worth of even exclusive biological life. In addition, 
an argument against the administering of euthanasia is that there are 
improved levels of palliative care and medication to limit the physical and 
mental suffering that a patient may experience. This point of view also 
assists in the weakening of the importance of the purpose of the limitation. 
According to Broude:77 
Changing attitudes towards the effective use of narcotic analgesics, the 
development of new routes and methods of administration, and a clinical 
approach based on scientific principles and humane care offer the promise of 
improved management of pain in terminally ill patients. 
John Finnis refers to Peter Admiraal, a leading Dutch exponent (and 
practitioner) of euthanasia, who stated in the mid-1980s that 
… pain is never a legitimate reason for euthanasia because methods exist to 
relieve it.78  
The very reason for palliative care is to assist those terminally ill patients in 
coping with their pain and suffering. In this regard, Craig Paterson 
comments:79 
Quality-of-life concerns should always be focused on the ways and means in 
which humanitarian resources can be deployed to improve the health of 
patients and should not be conflated with attempts to assess the overall 
'benefits of living' versus the 'benefits of death' as if the two can really be 
rationally weighed and compared to one another. Let me be quite clear that I 
am not seeking to trivialize in any way the burdens on life imposed by illness 
… Yet, notwithstanding the heavy toll those burdens inflict on patients, the 
only reasonable way to respond to those burdens is to do all we can to cure 
or diminish the pain and suffering of patients as best we can. We constantly 
need to remind ourselves that a life that is severely diminished in 'quality' is 
still capable of realizing and participating in a wide array of primary and 
secondary human goods – friendship, family, beauty, truth, etc. 
Paterson rightly points out that rationality, consciousness, self-awareness, 
moral agency, communication, emotionality and the capacity to feel pain, as 
the selected criteria in deciding on death, result in a plethora of critical 
questions such as: What level of self-awareness is required? What does it 
really mean to be self-aware? Which of the above criteria should be 
                                            
77  Broude 1987 SAMJ 543. 
78  Finnis 1998 Loy LA L Rev 1141; Finnis Human Rights and Common Good 266. 
79  Paterson Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia 107. 
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prioritised or do they all carry the same weight?80 In the words of Craig 
Paterson:81   
Threshold definitions of persons seem so contrived precisely because they do 
resort to such arbitrary and vague stipulations when seeking to 'pick' and 
'select' features and levels for determining the category of persons from the 
category of non-persons.  
This complexity consequently weakens the importance of the limitation as 
well. In addition, if the emphasis and importance were to be solely placed 
on the autonomy of the patient wishing to have his/her life terminated, then 
what about the medical practitioner's right to personal autonomy, self-
determination and privacy, which in turn includes reason, emotions, moral 
agency, self-awareness and sentience? Added to this is the fact that 
euthanasia concerns the intentional termination of innocent human life and 
this alone elevates the argument in support of the non-termination of human 
life in the context of euthanasia to even higher levels of credibility and 
rationality. 
The third criterion of the general limitations clause pertains to an analysis 
regarding the nature and extent of the limitation. In this regard, it is important 
to understand the medical practitioner's aversion to euthanasia from his/her 
contextual perspective. The belief in the absolute inviolability of innocent life 
and the respect it attracts is recognised in many religions. Ordinarily, 
intentionally killing innocent human life is outright prohibited.82 The severe 
effects such compulsion would exert on the practitioner's human dignity 
cannot be overly emphasised; as such, a person may believe 
himself/herself to be a murderer, subject to punishment. The aversion by a 
religious medical practitioner is not influenced solely by his/her obedience 
to religious texts; a deeper understanding of the religious psyche is 
necessary, especially in matters such as euthanasia that deal with the 
intentional termination of an innocent human life. Many religious persons 
stand in a perceived position of ultimate accountability towards what is 
believed to be an almighty and omnipotent God (or gods).83 It is therefore 
                                            
80  Paterson Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia 134. 
81  Paterson Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia 35. 
82  In Judaism and Christianity, the Ten Commandments specifically address and 
prohibit murder. See Exodus 20. The Quran in chapter 5:32 determines that the 
killing of one person is akin to the killing of the whole of humankind. Hindus, Jains 
and Buddhists abhor violence. For example, Hindu and Jain followers of 
Swaminarayan have the explicit commandment "Thou shalt not kill", which 
Swaminarayan considered true to original ancient Vedic teaching. Williams 
Introduction to Swaminarayan Hinduism 159.  
83  Polanyi Personal Knowledge 302.  
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challenging to believe that compelling a medical practitioner to participate 
in the administering of euthanasia does not result in substantive 
psychological distress. Daniel Garros points us to credible studies that have 
confirmed that it is naturally difficult for human beings to terminate the lives 
of others and that even those in the military require "massive techniques of 
decentralisation to be able to live with the consequences of killing during 
war".84 Although some might argue that the war context differs from the 
context of healthcare, this serves as an indication of the serious 
consequences related to the taking of human life per se.  
Regarding the relationship between the limitation and the purpose, which 
constitutes the fourth listed criterion of the general limitations clause, 
cognisance must be taken of the view expressed in S v Steyn,85 namely that 
a rational relationship ought to be found between a limitation and its 
purpose.86 The question therefore to be asked is whether the limitation 
would ensure that its purpose is achieved.87 The purpose related to the case 
at hand is that the patient who is terminally ill and who experiences pain 
should be allowed to die with dignity at the hands of a medical practitioner, 
either by means of active or passive forms of euthanasia. In this regard, the 
administering of euthanasia is understood to be of such vital constitutional 
importance that it would warrant compelling a medical practitioner to deny 
his/her own sincerely held convictions by limiting his/her free religious 
exercise substantively and invasively. The patient relies on the protection of 
his/her right to personal autonomy (which in turn implies the patient's right 
to protection of human dignity and privacy, as well as freedom and security 
of the person). The extent of this has been indicated clearly: personal 
inviolability involves not only being physically in control of one's body, but 
psychologically as well. The patient's will to live has subjectively diminished 
to the point where death becomes the preferred option, which is often 
because of the constant pain and suffering experienced. This pain and 
suffering supplements the purpose of the limitation, namely that maintaining 
the suffering of a person constitutes cruel treatment and the effects of the 
suffering often cause embarrassment to the patient and infringe upon 
his/her dignity.88 Here cognisance needs to be taken of the earlier argument 
                                            
84  Garros 2017 Health Ethics Today 9. 
85  S v Steyn 2001 1 SA 1146 (CC). 
86  S v Steyn 2001 1 SA 1146 (CC) paras 30-31. 
87  Rautenbach 2014 PELJ 2256. 
88  Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 2015 4 SA 50 (GP) 
paras 9.3-9.5: "As time progresses the Applicant's condition will become 
progressively worse and will later on require an even stronger doses of opioid drugs 
such as morphine and to possibly be hospitalized. He is becoming weaker by the 
day and needs constant assistance in normal daily activities such as getting up from 
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regarding the modern-day successes of palliative treatment as well as the 
questionable nature of the view that the body should be separated from the 
mind. Added to this, the critical questions presented by Craig Paterson 
(referred to earlier) regarding rationality, consciousness, self-awareness, 
moral agency, communication, emotionality and the capacity to feel pain as 
the selected criteria in deciding on death, should also be noted. These most 
certainly lessen the rational connection between the limitation and the 
purpose. It also needs to be noted that, in the event of the legalisation of 
euthanasia, the request of the patient would be limited only as far as his/her 
request is denied by a medical practitioner whose personal religious beliefs 
conflict with the patient's request. This means that the patient remains free 
to request another medical practitioner to assist him/her, thereby ensuring 
the protection of the patient's rights to privacy, freedom and security of the 
person as well as human dignity. 
The final determination according to the listed grounds in the general 
limitations clause is the determination whether there are other, less 
restrictive measures available that would achieve the same results. 
Therefore, should a party suggest a limitation, it should be proven that 
alternative measures, if any, had been considered, but that no option could 
be found that would achieve the desired result, leaving only the limiting 
option. In determining a less restrictive means, the court has made it clear 
that the standard to be attained should be realistic and reasonable.89 Less 
restrictive means may include placing more focus and effort on the 
application of palliative treatment. Then there is the proposal pertaining to a 
"roll" that can be compiled, along the lines of the "roll of non-objecting 
physicians". Such a roll would allow a patient to approach any medical 
practitioner on the roll directly, who would accordingly be authorised to 
acquiesce to the patient's request.90 Having said this (and for reasons 
argued throughout this article), it should remain the choice of the medical 
practitioner whether she would want to participate in the administering of 
                                            
bed, bathing, brushing his teeth and eating. As the Applicant's disease progresses 
and until his last breath, he will become confused and afraid. His last breath might 
even be with the aid of a machine. Applicant says that he is not afraid of dying, he is 
afraid of dying while suffering". 
89  S v Mamabolo 2001 3 SA 409 (CC) para 49.  
90  Such a roll should contain all the relevant details of the practitioner, including details 
regarding the area in which s/he performs his/her duties, and contact details to 
facilitate quick and efficient assistance. Also see Benson 2008 
https://www.cardus.ca/organization/news/625/physicians-patients-human-rights-
and-referrals-a-principled-approach-to-respecting-the-rights-of-physicians-and-
patients-in-ontario. 
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euthanasia, even in the absence of other practitioners who may be willing 
to assist in administering euthanasia. 
Those in support of euthanasia would argue that the limitation seeks to 
attain an admirable goal, but is the limitation reasonable and justifiable in 
an open and democratic South Africa based on human dignity, freedom and 
equality? It is clear from the above that compelling a person to act against 
his/her beliefs, knowing the toll which contravening his/her religious 
prescripts would levy, comprises a degrading, cruel and inhumane action. 
In addition, the State can indeed effect a less invasive approach, which 
would amount to the inclusion of a "conscientious objection clause" in 
possible future euthanasia legislation. Such a clause would cater effectively 
to the guaranteed rights of the medical practitioner, whilst providing the 
patient with the possibility of requesting another medical practitioner to 
assist in terminating his/her life. 
Here it is also apt to refer to equality jurisprudence (and by implication the 
possibility of unfair discriminatory practices). Section 9 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa is clear on religion's constituting one of the 
listed grounds regarding unfair discrimination. In this regard, it is argued that 
instructing or pressuring a medical practitioner into participating in the 
administering of euthanasia even though it is against such a practitioner's 
religious convictions may result in unfair discrimination. Elaborating upon 
this, section 1 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act91 defines "discrimination" as:  
… any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or 
situation which directly or indirectly – (a) imposes burdens, obligations or 
disadvantage on; or (b) withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from, 
any person on one or more of the prohibited grounds.  
In addition, the Equality Act lists criteria to assist in the determination of 
whether certain actions may constitute unfair discriminatory practices.92 
                                            
91  Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 
(PEPUDA), commonly referred to as the Equality Act. 
92  Section 14(2)-(3) of the Equality Act reads as follows: "(2) In determining whether 
the respondent has proved that the discrimination is fair, the following must be taken 
into account: (a) The context; (b) the factors referred to in ss (3); (c) whether the 
discrimination reasonably and justifiably differentiates between persons according to 
objectively determinable criteria, intrinsic to the activity concerned. (3) The factors 
referred to in ss (2) (b) include the following: (a) Whether the discrimination impairs 
or is likely to impair human dignity; (b) the impact or likely impact of the discrimination 
on the complainant; (c) the position of the complainant in society and whether he or 
she suffers from patterns of disadvantage or belongs to a group that suffers from 
such patterns of disadvantage; (d) the nature and extent of the discrimination; (e) 
whether the discrimination is systemic in nature; (f) whether the discrimination has a 
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Applying these criteria to the matter at hand, it becomes clear that there will 
be unfair discrimination where a medical practitioner is compelled to 
participate in the administering of euthanasia.  
The fact that such a medical practitioner finds himself/herself in the 
workplace, results in the Employment Equity Act (EEA)93 also having to 
come into play, and in this regard the emphasis is placed on whether such 
a medical practitioner should be "'reasonably accommodated"'. Pretorius et 
al state that:94  
The duty of reasonable accommodation comprises of positive measures that 
ought to be taken to meet … the different needs of those who, by reason of a 
protected characteristic such as … religious affiliation cannot be adequately 
served by arrangements that are suitable for people who do not share such a 
characteristic.  
According to Pretorius et al:95 
… read with the prohibition on unfair discrimination contained in sections 6(1) 
and (2),96 as well as the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, 
reasonable accommodation of religious practices and beliefs have to be 
adhered to by employers. Failure to reasonably accommodate may constitute 
direct or indirect discrimination based on religious belief. 
Pretorius et al refer to the requirements for a successful claim regarding 
workplace-based religious discrimination as set out by the Labour Appeal 
Court in SA Clothing and Textile Workers Union v Berg River Textiles – A 
                                            
legitimate purpose; (g) whether and to what extent the discrimination achieves its 
purpose; (h) whether there are less restrictive and less disadvantageous means to 
achieve the purpose; (i) whether and to what extent the respondent has taken such 
steps as being reasonable in the circumstances to – (i) address the disadvantage 
which arises from or is related to one or more of the prohibited grounds; or (ii) 
accommodate diversity". The relevance of these criteria (emanating from the 
Equality Act) for the workplace (which falls under the direct authority of the 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (see below) was confirmed in Du Preez v Minister 
of Justice and Constitutional Development 2006 3 All SA 271 (SE) para 25. 
93  One of the main objectives of this Act is to forbid unfair discrimination (based 
amongst other concerns on the listed grounds, which include religion) in the 
workplace. 
94  Pretorius, Klinck and Ngwena Employment Equity Law 2 (emphasis added). 
95  Pretorius, Klinck and Ngwena Employment Equity Law 54. 
96  The Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. S 6(1) reads as follows: "No person may 
unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an employee, in any employment 
policy or practice, on one or more grounds, including … religion … conscience … 
belief … culture … " 
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Division of Seardel Group Trading (Pty) Ltd,97 these being, amongst others 
that:98  
… it is incumbent on the [employees] to show that the employer by means of 
the workplace rule or policy interfered with their participation in or practice of 
their religion and the principle involved must be a central tenet of that religion. 
Applying the above to the scenario where a medical practitioner who refuses 
to participate in the administering of euthanasia due to his/her religious 
convictions  is instructed or pressurised into participating in the procedure, 
surely this would constitute a successful claim regarding unfair 
discrimination based on religion (and by implication, conscience)?99 Added 
to this, a hospital that has employed such a medical practitioner is 
necessitated to accommodate the practitioner reasonably. It is therefore 
clear that to instruct (or pressurise in any manner whatsoever) a medical 
practitioner to administer euthanasia where such an action is opposed to 
the practitioner's religious convictions (and consequently his/her 
conscience) would constitute unfair discrimination.100 One also needs to 
bear in mind that whatever the finding may be regarding the determination 
of unfair discrimination in accordance with the EEA and PEPUDA, an 
argument that this is a reasonable and justifiable limitation (in accordance 
with section 36 of the Constitution) of the medical practitioner's right mainly 
                                            
97  SA Clothing and Textile Workers Union v Berg River Textiles – A Division of Seardel 
Group Trading (Pty) Ltd 2012 33 ILJ 972 (LC). 
98  Pretorius, Klinck and Ngwena Employment Equity Law 55. 
99  This is especially supported by the earlier argument pertaining to the importance of 
religion and the convictions of the medical practitioner who objects against the 
administering of euthanasia due to his/her religious belief and the centrality of such 
a belief to his/her religion. 
100  Earlier discussions add to this argument where the importance of the relevant rights 
(especially those pertaining to the right to freedom of religion and human dignity) 
were discussed in detail. Here cognisance also needs to be taken of the relevance 
of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) against the background of possibilities 
of "unfair dismissals". In other words, a doctor who has been dismissed by the 
hospital management for refusing to participate in any act of euthanasia may argue 
that s/he has been unfairly dismissed. In this regard, Du Plessis and Fouché state 
that "In terms of s 187 of the LRA some dismissals are automatically unfair. In the 
main a dismissal is automatically unfair if an employer discriminates against an 
employee or if an employee is dismissed because he exercised his rights in terms 
of the Act". Du Plessis and Fouché Practical Guide to Labour Law 320-321. More 
specifically, and amongst others, a dismissal because of the employer's unfair 
discrimination qualifies such a dismissal as an automatically unfair dismiss. It was 
argued above that instructing or pressurising (in any manner whatsoever) a medical 
practitioner to administer euthanasia against his/her religious convictions constitutes 
unfair discrimination and therefore to dismiss a medical practitioner due to such a 
practitioner’s not wanting to violate his/her own religious beliefs and convictions 
through the administration of euthanasia automatically constitutes an unfair 
dismissal. 
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to human dignity and freedom of religion would certainly not succeed (as 
argued earlier). 
5 Conclusion 
This article argues for the protection of the medical practitioner who would 
conscientiously object to the administering of euthanasia, if euthanasia were 
to be legalised in South Africa along the lines of the position in Belgium, 
Canada and the Netherlands, for example, Such an objection would 
foundational to the objector's religious convictions and human dignity, as 
well as his/her personal autonomy, and would be inextricably connected 
with his/her apperception of the importance and sanctity of human life. 
Emanating from this understanding is the view that bodily life is an intrinsic 
good and is therefore an end in itself, not a mere instrument towards the 
attainment of something seemingly more important. From the point of view 
of the patient who chooses to die, such a request is viewed by the pro-
euthanasia camp as being in accordance with the right to privacy (and 
personal autonomy) and ultimately the right to human dignity, and that 
consequently the parameters of the right to life are viewed by the pro-
euthanasia camp as qualifying for the termination of life. Therefore the 
expectation is that as service providers the medical staff at a hospital 
(whether public or private) should grant such a request. Under normal 
circumstances it is generally expected of a service provider to provide its 
services without discriminating on any grounds. However, even as the 
patient claims protection of his/her rights to privacy and human dignity, so 
too should the medical practitioner claim protection of his/her rights to 
freedom of religion and conscience, privacy, and human dignity, rights that 
are better understood in the context of conscientious objection against 
participating in the administration of euthanasia, when taking into 
cognisance the importance of innocent human life, even when viewed 
exclusively from a biological context. In this regard, arguments have been 
presented confirming the importance of the protection of the rights of the 
medical practitioner. 
Bearing the above in mind, pro-euthanasia legislation will have to include a 
conscientious objection clause, which protects the interests of the medical 
practitioner who may want to be excluded from the administering of the 
forms of euthanasia described earlier on. Such a clause should provide the 
medical practitioner, whether such practitioner is a medical doctor, a nurse, 
a pharmacist or any other person involved in the process of administering 
of euthanasia (whether directly or indirectly), upon request, the option to 
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refuse participation, if such refusal is based on sincerely101 held religious (or 
other) beliefs. The general limitation clause has been thoroughly applied 
(above) to assist in the determination of whether the rights of the medical 
practitioner may be reasonably and justifiably limited. The finding emanating 
from this is that it would constitute an unjustifiable and unreasonable 
limitation to have a medical practitioner participate against his/her will in the 
administering of euthanasia. Therefore, should euthanasia (and PAS) be 
legalised in South Africa, as in Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands, for 
example, a clause ought to be contained in the corresponding legislation 
that would cater to the needs of medical practitioners who may be troubled 
by their consciences. Such a clause should not only afford the practitioners 
the opportunity to refuse to act in accordance with the patient's request, but 
also accommodate the possibility that a practitioner, unlike practitioners in 
other jurisdictions, may refuse to direct the patient to another medical 
practitioner. As to a formulation pertaining to the reading of such a 
conscientious objection clause, the following is proposed:102 
No person shall be under any duty, whether by contract or by any statutory or 
other legal requirement, to participate in any diagnosis, treatment, omission of 
treatment or other action authorised by this Act103 to which he has a 
conscientious objection. If an attending physician whose patient makes a 
request to be assisted to die in accordance with this Act has a conscientious 
objection as referred to earlier, he shall not be responsible for ensuring that 
the patient is referred to an attending physician who does not have such a 
conscientious objection. 
A number of states around the world have legalised euthanasia practices 
within the healthcare system. There are also developments in other states 
tending towards the enactment of euthanasia legalisation. It is most 
certainly not a distant possibility that euthanasia legislation may become a 
reality in South Africa. These developments and possibilities call for the 
accommodation of the right of a medical practitioner to object 
conscientiously to the administering of euthanasia. 
                                            
101  Regarding sincerity as a requirement, the South African Constitutional Court is of the 
view that: "A religious belief is personal, and need not be rational, nor need it be 
shared by others. A court must simply be persuaded that it is a profound and 
sincerely held belief". MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 
(CC) para 146. Also see Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 1 SA 524 (CC) para 
159.  
102  Having taken as a guide Britain's Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill [HL Bill 17] 
and the Assisted Dying Bill [HL Bill 24], which was drafted after the Assisted Dying 
for the Terminally Ill Bill. 
103  By "Act" is intended euthanasia legislation of the type reflected in Canada, Belgium 
and the Netherlands.  
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